地方政府间非合作博弈的机理及治理对策研究行政管理专业论文.docx

II II Abstract Since the reform and opening up, Chinese economic growth in local government played a very important role in the region. However, due to productivity constraints, resource scarcity, the lack of cooperation in local government in the process of market ideology ,and the fiscal decentralization system increased non-cooperative game of local government, and the decentralization reform of local government expanse the power base of n-cooperative game, and the pressure-type cadre management system reduce the possibility of cooperation between local government. The level of coordination mechanisms for effective cooperation of local government is low, and the local government become the spokesman for local interests. The local governments compete to pursue the maximum interests which caused the non-cooperative game of local government in the political market, product markets and factor markets. Besides it explicit for local protection and market segmentation, the local War between the local governments, the shortage supply of regional public goods, the indifference attitude of the local government on the need for cooperation projects . This phenomenon not only distort the function of market about allocating the resources also reduce the trust of inter-regional cooperation , which obstruct forming the order of inter-regional cooperation, and has brought about negative effects on the operational mechanism of market economy, and restricted the impovation in effectiveness of local government administration. The treatment of non-cooperative game among local governments is an inherent requirement for economic development, and followed by the need to reduce the conflict between regions, and it also important to response to external common challenges. In addition, the treatment of non-cooperative game among local governments is feasible. Therefore, articles propose the non-cooperative game between local governance should follow the following basic principles: the prin