弗协调的弗雷格.pdfVIP

StudiesinLogic,Vol.7, No. 2 (2014): 81–101 PII:1674-3202(2014)-02-0081-21 ParaconsistentFrege JingxianLiu CollegeofPhilosophy and Public Administration, Liaoning University liujingxian@ Abstract. Thispapershowsthenon-trivialityofsecond-orderparaconsistentcomprehension and Frege’s infamous Basic Law V. Then, it shows that Hume’s Principle can be derived from BasicLawVbymeansofparaconsistentinferenceprovidedthatequinumerosityisregardedas primitive. Finally, it shows that paraconsistent Hume’s Principle cannot serve as a foundation for mathematics of Logicism. 1 Introduction Frege claimed that arithmetic can be reduced to logic, or that arithmetic is a highly developed logic, that is, so-called Logicism. In Grundgesetze, Frege derived the axioms of arithmetic from second-order logic and Basic Law V ; the latter says that the extension of the concept is the same as the extension of the concept if andonlyif and areequivalent: where is the extension operator. However, Russell’s paradox can also be derived from second-order logic and Basic Law V. The origin of Russell’s paradox is the inconsistency of Basic Law V and second-order comprehension; the latter says that everyexpressibleformulaassertstheexistenceofaconcept: ϕ where does notoccurfreein ϕ Proof-theoretically,accordingtocomprehension, canassertthe existenceoftheconcept‘notbelongtoitself’,thatis, ;then,accordingtoBasicLaw V,thereexistsanextensionofthatconcept,thatis, ;therefore, fallsunder if and only if does not falls under . Model-theoretically, comprehension requires thatthesetoverwhichconceptvariablesrangeisthepowersetofthesetoverwhich object variables range, while Basic Law V requires that there exists one-one corre- spondence between concept