愤怒博弈者的更新逻辑.pdfVIP

StudiesinLogic,Vol.9, No. 3 (2016): 71–88 PII:1674-3202(2016)-03-0071-18 * AnUpdateLogicfor Games with AngryPlayers Fan Huang InstituteofLogic and Cognition, Sun Yat-senUniversity wong.vanz@ Xuefeng Wen InstituteofLogic and Cognition, Sun Yat-senUniversity wxflogic@ Abstract. Angry players in games often make aggressive decisions to minimize their oppo- nents’ payoffs even if they are fully aware that their actions are going against their personal interest. Wemodelsuchbehaviourpatternwithangryupdateoperatorsinmodallogic. Instead ofmodifyingtheangryplayer’spreferenceforupdate,werestrictherstrategicaccessibilityre- lationsothatonlythoseactionsleadingtoheropponent’slowestpayoffarekept. Weconstruct an axiomatic system for the logic and prove its soundness and weak completeness. Finally, we apply the logic to ultimatum gamesinwhichtheresponderisangry. 1 Introduction Thispaperfocusesontheemotionofanger,anddevelopsamodallogictochar- acterisetheeffectofangeronhumanbehaviourinsequentialgames. Humanemotion isnotoftenseenasapropersubjectforlogicalstudy(foranexception,see[1]),mainly because most emotions have complex cause and unstable consequence. This paper thereby focuses on the emotion of anger, which is one of the most sustainedly in- vestigated emotions (for a review, see [2]). Anger, unlike many other emotions such as envy or pride, has relatively stable behaviour pattern, especially in the context of games ([11]). One famous example is the ultimatum game, where in response to un- fairtreatment,angryresponderstenttorejectproposalsthattheycancertainlybenefit from [7, 8]. Such aggressive behaviour is often treated as the c