基于优惠券激励的需求响应双层优化机制.PDFVIP

第 47 卷 第 1 期 电力系统保护与控制 Vol.47 No.1 2019 年 1 月 1 日 Power System Protection and Control Jan. 1, 2019 DO : 10.7667/PSPC17 1826 基于优惠券激励的需求响应双层优化机制 王 均，黄 琦 (电力系统广域测量与控制四川省重点实验室，电子科技大学 械与电气工程学院，四川 成都 611731) 摘要：提出了一种用户 自主参与的需求响应(Customer Voluntary Demand Response, CVDR)计划，电力企业为用户 提供 惠券激励，鼓励用户在尖峰电价时减少用电需求。电力企业通过实施 CVDR 计划降低 自身尖峰电价的购电 经济损失，同时用户在 惠券激励作用下提升收益。因此提出了电力企业和用户之间合作博弈的双层 化模型， 结合 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 条件和 Big-M 法将双层 化转化为一个单层混合整数线性问题进行求解。算例仿真采用 居民和小商业配电网，通过数值分析验证 CVDR 计划增强了用户的收益，减少了电力企业经济损失，实现了调峰 需求。 关键词：需求响应； 惠券激励；经济损失；用户效用函数；配电网 Coupon incentives based customers voluntary demand response program via bilevel optimization mechanism WANG Jun, HUANG Qi (Sichuan Provincial Key Lab of Power System Wide Area Measurement and Control, School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering (University of Electronic Science and Technology of China), Chengdu 611731, China) Abstract: This paper proposes a Customer Voluntary Demand Response (CVDR) program, in which the Load Serving Entity (LSE) caters coupon rebates to customers for demand reduction during peak pricing. With the implementation of CVDR program, LSE reduces economic losses during peak pricing and customers improve profits with coupon incentives simultaneously. Therefore, a bilevel programming for LSE and customers cooperative game is formulated in CVDR program. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition and Big-M method