基于XBRL的财务信息标准博弈分析.PDFVIP

8 2 Vol. 8 o. 2 2011 2 Chinese Journal of Management Feb. 2011 XBRL 1 2 2 赵现明 张天西 孙晓东 ( 1.华东师范大学; 2. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院) : 运用两阶段 塔克伯格博弈模型研究了XBRL 在利益相关者之间的扩散问题,分 析了XBRL 技术标准的采用对主体企业和利益相关者交易价格交易量市场份额以及利润 的影响结果表明: 当部分利益相关者采用XBRL 时,主体企业的总交易量变大; 对采用者来 说, 交易价格变高, 交易量变大, 市场份额增大, 当采用者数量较少时利润减少, 而当采用者数 量足够多时利润增加; 对未采用者来说, 交易价格变低, 交易量变小, 市场份额缩小, 利润总额 降低对主体企业来说, 部分采用而不是所有利益相关者都采用 XBRL 技术标准才是最佳结 果, 也就是存在最优的采用者数量使得主体企业在XBRL 技术扩散中获得最大利润 : XBRL; ; ; ; : C93;F530. 68 : A : 1672884X(2011 Game Analysis of Financial Information Standard Based on XBRL 1 2 2 ZHAO Xianming ZHA G T ianxi SU Xiaodong ( 1.East China ormal University, Shanghai, China; 2. Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China) Abstract : This paper studies theXBRL standardization diffusion among the stakeholders based on Stackelberg model. We analyze the adoption effects of XBRL on the main firm s as well as its stake holders transaction prices, trading volumes, market shares and profit. The results show that when there are part of stakeholders adopting XBRL, moretrading volumes of the main firm will be realized. Transactions price, trading volume and market share of adopters will increase. When the number of early adopters is less, the profit of adopters will decrease; however when the number of adopters is large enough, the profit will increase. In contrast, the transactions price, trading volume, market share and profit will decrease for the stakeholders who did not adopt XBRL. An interesting outcome we found is that a partial adoption by the stakeholder base is optimal for the main firm. T hat is, there are an optimal number o