中国征地中的双重委托代理问题-中国科技论文在线.PDFVIP

中国科技论文在线 第23 卷 第 10 期 中国土地科学 Vol.23 No.10 2009 年 10 月 China Land Science Oct.,2009 中国征地中的双重委托代理问题 李 菁，刘玉琴 （华中科技大学土地管理系，湖北武汉430074） 摘要：研究目的：运用委托代理理论和博弈论方法论证中国征地过程具有双重委托代理的特征及存在的问题。研究方法： 归纳法，博弈分析法和图示分析法。研究结果：违法征地频繁发生的原因：（1）显性契约中的地方政府通过政治手段将隐 性契约中的委托代理关系瓦解，致使显性约束力明显占优；（2）各利益主体在规则选择上存在不确定性。研究结论：征地 制度的双重委托代理关系，使国家监督处于低效状态；行政权利过大，地方政府利益的一致化及隐性契约缺乏监控和惩 罚机制都给违规征地创造了条件。 关键词：双重委托代理；征地；显性契约；隐性契约；博弈 中图分类号：F301.2 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1001- 8158（2009）10- 0052- 07 Problems of Dual Principal-agent Relationships in Land Requisition in China LI Jing, LIU Yu- qin （Land Administration Department, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China） Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the characteristics of dual principal- agent relationships and the existing problems in the process of land requisition in China through the use of the principal- agent and game theories. Methods of induction, game theory, and figure demonstration analysis were employed. The results indicate that the reasons of frequent illegal land requisitions are as follows: （1）the local government in explicit contract abates the implicit principal- agent relationship between the farmers and the collective economic organizations through political means, which results in the dominant role of the explicit contract in land requisition process; （2）the rules chosen by related interest groups are uncertain. It is concluded that land requisi