上市公司超法人治理边界、高管超额激励与企业价值.docxVIP

上市公司超法人治理边界、高管超额激 励与企业价值 雷倩华陈嘉欣 华南理工大学工商管理学院 摘要： 实际经济活动屮，公司的治理范围已超越了其法人边界，但传统的公司治理研 究却局限在法人边界之内，鲜有文献探讨公司治理边界扩大后的特征对公司自 身治理的影响。本文搜集了上市公司子公司、合营公司与联营公司的数据，并以 此作为公司超法人治理边界的替代，探讨了上市公司超法人治理边界的扩大与 高管超额激励之间的关系及其对企业价值的影响。本文发现上市公司超法人治理 边界越大，其高管的超额货币性收益和非货币性收益越高，上市公司高管由超 法人治理边界的扩大而获取的超额收益对企业价值有着显著的正向影响。进一步 检验发现，上市公司超法人治理边界与高管超额激励之间的关系在不同产权性 质的公司和不同两权分离状况的公司中并无显著差异。但上市公司超法人治理边 界对高管超额激励的影响程度在欠发达地区的上市公司中更大。本文的结论支持 了有效契约理论在屮国上市公司高管薪酬制定屮的适用性，为上市公司的高管 治理提供了一个新的视角。 关键词： 治理边界;超额激励;企业价值; 基金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 Corporate Governance Boundary Beyond Legal Person in Lis ted Firms, Excess Incentive, and Firm Value LEI Qianhua CHEN Jiaxin School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology: Abstract： In the real economic activities, the governance scope of the parent finn has gone beyond its own legal governance boundary, but the traditional research of corporate governance is limited within the legal boundary, few papers study the effects of expanding of governance boundary on the firm s corporatc governance. Using hand-collected data of subsidiary companies, joint venture firms and affiliated firms as the substitute for governance boundary beyond legal person, this paper studies the relation between governance boundary beyond legal person in 1isted firms, executives excess incentive and firm value, I find theit the larger the governance boundary beyond legal person in listed firms, the higher excess monetary and non-monetary benefits, which lead to higher firm value. Robust tes ts don t change the con elusions. Further tests find t hat, t here are no differences the relation between governance boundary beyond legal person and excess incentive in firms with different property right and different separation of control rights and cash flow rights. But the expanding of governance boundary makes more effect on excess incentive in listed firms in underdeveloped areas. The conclusions in this paper support the efficient contract theory is suitable in Chinese 1 isted firms