国企高管政治晋升激励对政治迎合行为的影响研究-财务管理专业论文.docxVIP

万方数据 万方数据 摘 要 随着国企改革的不断深入，能否建立合理的高管激励机制成为了决定国企改革成败的 关键因素。我国特有的政企人才交流制度使得国企高管兼具了“企业家”和“政府官员” 双重身份特点。在此背景之下，我国形成了对国企高管特殊的激励方式——政治晋升激励。 目前，这一领域的研究大多集中于探讨政治晋升激励对于企业业绩的促进作用，而有关政 治晋升激励对管理者行为影响的研究却很缺乏。 本文通过文献和现实的归纳总结，提出一个新的概念——政治迎合行为，将国企高管 为迎合政府部门的需要，做出的虽有利于实现其自身的政治晋升，但未必有利于企业可持 续发展的行为定义为政治迎合行为。本文研究了国企高管的政治晋升激励对政治迎合行为 的影响关系。基于地方政府政绩的需求和国资委对高管考核标准的考虑，本文选择过度投 资和盈余管理这两种最典型的政治迎合行为进行研究。实证结果表明：首先，政治晋升激 励会导致国企高管为了获得政治晋升而迎合地方政府的政绩需求做出过度投资的行为，这 在董事长身上体现的尤为明显，而薪酬激励会削弱这种正相关关系，特别是在总经理身上， 这种抑制作用更加显著。其次，国企高管会迎合国资委的财务业绩考核做出盈余管理的行 为，而薪酬激励会削弱这种正相关关系。总而言之，对国企高管的政治晋升激励并不是可 以彻底改善我国国企激励机制的长久之计，而是具有短暂成效、虚假繁荣，却仍会带来诸 多政治迎合行为的饮鸩止渴的激励方式。 本文的研究为完善国企激励机制提供了理论参考，为正确评估国企改革中各项政策措 施，特别是激励方式的选择与实施效果提供了新的分析思路，兼具一定的理论和现实意义。 关键词：政治晋升激励；政治迎合行为；过度投资；盈余管理 I Abstract With the deepening of SOE reform, to establish a rational executives incentives becomes a key factor in determining the success of SOE reform.The personnel exchange system of government and enterprise allows the state executives has both entrepreneurs and government official identity features.Under this background,our country has formed a special incentives, that is political promotion incentives.In recent years, research in this area are gradually concerned by our scholars, they mostly studied the political promotion incentives to the role of corporate performance, but the study of the affection of this incentives to managers’ behavior is very lacking. This paper summarizes the literature and reality, to create a new concept ,that is the political catering behavior, which is the behavior that SOE executives in order to get their own political promotion, they do something to meet the needs of government departments, but not be benefit to the long-term sustainability of the enterprise.This paper mainly studies the impact of the political promotion incentives on political catering behavior.Considering the needs of local government performance and the SAC for consideration state executive performance appraisal methods, this paper selects over investme