基准模型及其扩展模型下的招投标策略研究-应用数学专业论文.docxVIP

AbstractThe Abstract The theofy and application of the auction is an important branch of economics，im content involves two respects research,that is quality analysis and quanaty analysis． Auction,as all old mechanism of trading,has its history over at least two thousand years, but economists began to study them less than 100 years ago．With the appearance of the game theory and its e】【tensive application,the auction theory had got a considerable development．Now,the auction form is more and mOre．in the me雒lime,its position is more and more important．So，the theory and application of tbe auction is a question that is worth studying． Analyses begin with simplifying all kinds of auctions into four“standard”or basic types of auctions： English Auction(ascending-bid auction),Dutch auction (descending-bid auction),First Price Auction and Second Price Auction(Vickrey Auction)．Among them，English auction is applied most,while the Second Price Auction is much less commonly used than other types of auctions．It is studied in part[xxxtuse of its attractive theoretical properties． Early economists conjectured that expected prices generated by different types of auctions might differ fxom each other．But under the Benchmark Model We have the conclusion that different auction forms yield the same expected revenue．This is the Revenue Eqllivalem Theorem(PET)．Despite perfoa reasoning of PET,it does not match what We have observed in practice．Research on the expended IPV model is much important． This paper research the sequential auction of the bidder and the revenue of the bid taker under Independent Pfivatc Value(Ⅱ叼Model．Then，We study on the expended 口V model．When the bidder is risk-averse．research on the revenue of the bid taker through analyze the sequential auction of the bidder,the revenue is higher in the first-price auction．When the bidders are colluding,We analyses the bidders collusive biding behavior and the strategic response by the seller at singie州ect second-price and first-pr