两级供应链中的动态定价问题-管理科学与工程专业论文.docxVIP

摘 摘 要 摘 要 本论文的主要目标是研究在动态因素如成本学习，需求饱和和价格参考效应 的影响下，双边垄断的供应链中的动态定价问题。在包含一个制造商和一个独立 的零售商的分散式渠道中，我们建立了一个 Stackelberg 微分博弈模型。运用最 优控制和博弈论的方法，我们得到了制造商和零售商的均衡定价策略并研究上述 动态效应对于渠道效率的影响。（1）首先，我们关注于供应层面的成本学习效应。 在制造商预先承诺批发价格的开环定价策略中，短视的定价策略并认为同样是最 优的。尽管每个渠道成员都受益于较高的成本学习参数，渠道效率则更加糟糕。 我们认为，制造商可以通过雇佣大量竞争的零售商或是与零售商反复谈判来缓解 渠道低效的问题。（2）而后我们研究的是需求方面的价格参考效应，其描述的是 过去的价格会影响产品的现在的需求。与集中式渠道相比，我们指出对于特定的 顾客群，渗透定价比撇指定价更加有利。另外，当顾客对于市场价格和参考价格 之间的差异的更敏感时，或是顾客对于产品的忠诚度较低时，渠道效率相对较低。 （3）最后，我们在随机的供应链中考虑了成本（成本学习效应）和需求层面（需 求饱和效应）均存在动态效应的问题。在不确定性下降的情况下，结论显示需求 不确定性会推高零售价格。再者，数量方法显示，在分散式渠道中，确定性的定 价策略会优于随机性的定价策略。这个与直觉相悖的结论可以解释为，确定性的 策略会导致对产品定价过低，这恰好抵消了由双边际效应而造成的零售价格过高 的问题。 关键词：动态定价，成本学习效应，需求饱和效应，价格参考效应，开环定价策 略，反馈定价策略 I ABSTRACT ABSTRACT ABSTRACT The target of the thesis is to investigate the dynamic pricing policies in a bilateral monopoly supply chain under dynamic factors such as cost learning, demand saturation and reference price effects. We present a Stackelberg differential game in a disintegrate channel consisting of a manufacturer and her independent retailer. Employing the optimal control and game theories, we derive the equilibrium pricing strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer and investigate the impacts of such dynamic factors on channel efficiency. (1) First, we focus on the cost learning effect in the supply side. In the open-loop case where the manufacturer commits about the wholesale price preliminarily, a short-term price strategy is suggested to be optimal. Although each member benefits from a higher cost learning effect, the channel inefficiency is deteriorated. We highlight that, to mitigate the channel inefficiency, the manufacturer could either employ multiple competing retailers or renegotiate with the retailer about the wholesale price frequently. (2) Then we focus on the reference price effect in the demand side, which describes how past price affects current demand of the frequently purchased product. Comparing with the integrated channel, we indicate that price penetration