基于委托代理的网络广告收益演化机制研究.docVIP

基于委托-代理的网络广告收益分配演化机制研究 王 迅 桂波 林宏伟 电子科技大学经济与管理学院 摘 要：考虑一个广告联盟商和一个网络广告媒体的合作，在信息不对称的情况下，网络广告媒体的收益受到自身的努力程度、风险偏好和外生变量的影响，运用委托-代理理论建立了广告联盟商和网络广告媒体之间的激励优化模型。通过优化对模型求解，给出了不同收益分配机制相互转化的临界条件。结果表明：分配系数与其努力水平正相关，与网络广告媒体的风险规避程度负相关。风险规避程度越低，方差越小，网络广告媒体越趋向于采用共享报酬分配模式；反之，则趋向于固定报酬分配模式。外生不确定因素越多，风险越大，方差越大，网络广告媒体的努力水平越低，网络广告媒体越趋向于采用固定报酬分配机制；反之，则越趋向于共享报酬分配机制。 关键词：网络广告；委托-代理；最优合同；演化机制；收益分配 中图分类号：C931.1 F224.32 文标识献码：A 文章编号 Study of evolution mechanism for online advertising’s revenue distribution Based on Principal – agent theory Wang xun Gui bo Ling hong wei 　 School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China;) Abstract: Considering the cooperation of an online advertising network with many publishers, in the condition of asymmetric information, revenues of publishers depend on their own efforts, attitude of their risk preferences and the influence of exogenous variables. The incentive optimization model was built between the online ads network and publishers using principal-agent theory. Furthermore, the optimization solutions of model were given; critical conditions were given by evolution of different distribution mechanism. The results show that the coefficient of distribution revenues is positive correlation to their effort level, and negative correlation to the level of risk aversion. The lower of risk aversion, smaller variance, publishers tend to adopt the Shared remuneration distribution mode; conversely, tend to fixed compensation distribution mode. The more exogenous uncertainties, the more risk, the greater variance, the lower level of efforts, the publishers tend to adopt the fixed payment distribution mechanism; on the contrary, the more tendency to share the remuneration distribution mechanism. Keywords: online advertising; principal-agent; optimal contracts; mechanism of evolution; revenues distribution. 1 问题的提出 网络广告就是广告主通过网络媒体劝说受众并能与之进行交互的一种广告形式[1]，随着互联网的发展，网络广告不仅成为商家进行产品和服务推广的媒介，而且网络广告也越来越成为众多门户网站和长尾网站的赢利方式。与传