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Abstract
Although the cooperation behavior is a wide spread phenomenon in the human society
and nature, the cooperation is usually not an optimal strategy from the perspective of the
Darwinian evolutionary theory. Thus, how to explain the persistence and emergence of
cooperation has become an active topic within the academia. Among them, the evolutionary
game theory has provided a powerful framework to illustrate the evolution of cooperation.
With the rapid development of cloud computing technology and the advent of big data era,
there are a growing number of available services on the network. Thus, what the users focus
on is not the availability of the service, but shifted to the quality of service. At present, users
put forward new requirements to the recommendation system.
In this thesis, to characterize the influence of reputation mechanism on the spatial public
goods game, two new models with reputation are utilized to investigate the evolution of
cooperation. In order to meet the requirements of users ,we propose two new methods of
recommendation to further enhance the diversity of the recommended services. The main
contents of the thesis and innovative points are described as follows:
1) To put forward an evolutionary game model to investigate the evolution and risk
analysis of cooperation under the spatial public goods game(PGG), in which the individual
reputation is obviously utilized to cut down the individual risk of being exploited during the
evolution of cooperation. In this model, based on the individual utility, the strategy state will
be asynchronously updated according to the Fermi-like
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