第3讲3博弈论模板.ppt

上次内容回顾; 局中人2 L R U 局中人1 M D;Best Response (BR);L、R概率为0.5时;假定1认为2选择r的概率为p(r)，则1选U、M、D的期望收益分别为;）;BR是期望收益最大时的反应;点球博弈;Partnership Game;参与人的BR是什么？;b=1/4时;纳什均衡;Nash Equilibrium;Definition In the n-player game G={S1,… , Sn; u1, … , un}, the strategies profile ( s1*…, sn* ) are a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, si* is (at least tied for （至少不劣于）) player i’s best response to the strategies specified for the n-1 other players, ( s1*…, sn-1* , sn+1* ,…, sn* ): ui( s1*…, sn-1* , si* , sn+1* ,