price theory of multi-sided platforms多边平台价格理论.pdfVIP

APriceTheoryofMulti-SidedPlatforms

ByE.GLENWEYL

Draft:October6,2009

Idevelopageneraltheoryofmonopolypricingofnetworks.Platformsuse

insulatingtariffstoavoidcoordinationfailure,implementinganydesiredal-

location.Profit-izationdistortsinthespiritofSpence(1975)byinter-

nalizingonlynetworkexternalitiestomarginalusers.Thustheempiricaland

prescriptivecontentofthepopularRochetandTirole(2006)modeloftwo-sided

marketsturnsonthenatureofuserheterogeneity.Iproposeamoreplausible,

yetequallytractable,modelofheterogeneityinwhichusersdifferintheirin-

comeorscale.Myapproachprovidesageneralmeasureofmarketpowerand

helpspredicttheeffectsofpriceregulationandmergers.

JEL:

Keywords:

Thepricingproblemsofpaymentandadvertisingplatformshavemuchincommon.Bothseek

toattracttwodistinctgroupsofusers:AmExneedscardholdersandmerchantswhiletheNew

YorkTimesrecruitsreadersandadvertisers.Becausethevalueeachgrouptakesfromusingthese

servicesdependsonthesizeoftheothersideofthemarket,theplatform’spricingandmarketing

strategiestoeachgrouparecloselylinked.Thereforedirectedatalleviatingdistortions

causedbymarketpowerintheseindustriesmusttakeaccountofhowinterventionsononeside

affectwelfareandplatformbehaviorontheother.

HarvardSocietyofFellowsandToulouseSchoolofEconomics:78MountAuburnStreet,Cambridge,MA02138,

weyl@.Thispaperwassplitoffasonepartofapreviousworkingpaper“MonopoliesinTwo-Sided

Markets:ComparativeStaticsandIdentification