[约翰·纳什博士论文.(英文版,.PDF格式)].Two-Person.Cooperative.Games.pdf

TWO-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAMES BY JOHN NASH In this paper, the author extends his previous treatment of The Bargaining Problem to a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role. A new approachis introduced involving the elaboration of the threat concept. INTRODUCTION THE THEORY here was developed to treat economic (or other) presented situations involving two individuals whose interests are neither com- pletely opposed nor completely coincident. The word cooperative is used because the two individuals are supposed to be able to discuss the situation and agree on a rational joint plan of action, an agreement that should be assumed to be enforceable. It is conventional to call these situations gameswhen they are being studied from an abstract mathematical viewpoint. Here the original situation is reduced to a mathematical description, or model. In the abstract game formulation only the minimum quantity of information necessary for the solution is retained. What the actual alternative courses of action are among which the individuals must choose is not regarded as essential information. These alternatives are treated as abstract objects without special qualities and are called strategies. Only the attitudes (like or dislike) of the two individuals towards the ultimate results of the use of the various possible opposing pairs of strategies are considered; but this information must be well utilized and must be expressed quantitatively. The theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern applies to some of the games considered here. Their assumption that it is possible for the players to make side-payments in a commod