我们感知到什么 _ 奥斯汀对知觉问题的思考.pdfVIP

摘 要 “我们感知到什么？”这个问题源自对错觉的思考。如果感知的对象是物 质事物，为什么我们会感知到一些物质事物所不具备的性质呢？在错觉中我们感 知到的东西究竟是什么呢？ 艾耶尔提出：“我们直接感知到的是感觉予料”，以此还为经验知识找到了“感 觉予料陈述”作为不可错的基础。奥斯汀深入剖析了艾耶尔的感觉予料论以及基 础主义经验论原则，运用语言现象学的方法，从语词的使用、到立论的根据、论 证的逻辑，再到背后的动机，多角度多方面地批驳了艾耶尔的主张。 奥斯汀主张，解释错觉并不需要假设一种非物质的知觉对象作为中介。事实 上，我们的知觉中包含着识别和理解，错觉之错在于我们对知觉内容的理解和识 别出了差子。 在回答 “我们感知到什么”时，与其说我们是在回答知觉的对象，不如说是 在提供我们关于对象的知觉认识：我们可以把对象感知为不同的东西，描述为不 同的东西。艾耶尔把物质事物和感觉予料作为唯一备选的两种答案，是把“我们 感知到什么”过于狭隘地理解为对“知觉对象”的追问。 【关键词】错觉感觉予料 知觉 知觉对象 知觉内容 知觉认识 语言现象学 5 Abastract “What do we perceive?” is a question which comes from the thinking about illusions. If material things are the objects of our perception,why we do perceive some qualities that are not belong to the associated material things? In illusions, what on earth do we perceive? Ayer insists: ‘What we directly perceive are sense-data’,and furthermore, he produces the incorrigible foundations for the empirical knowledge. Austin analyses Ayer’s sense-data theory and his principles of Empirical Foundationalism deeply. Austin argue:To explain the illusion cases need not suppose a kind of immaterial objects of perception as the intermediaries. In fact, our perceptions involve recognition and understanding, what is wrong in illusions is our understanding and recognition. When we answer the question ‘what do you perceive?’, we are giving the knowledge of perceptions rather than only objects of perceptions. We could perceive or describe the objects as different things. Ayer takes material things and sense-data as the only two choices, which is to take “what do you perceive” as strictly asking for the objects of perceptions. 【Key words】illusion; sense-data; perception; the objects of perception; the contents of perceptions; the knowledge of perceptions;linguistic phenomenology