薪酬作为组织文化信号：宣传个人或集体的激励效应外文翻译.docVIP

外文题目 Compensation as a signal of organizational culture: the effects of advertising individual or collective incentives 外文出处 The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 2009(7)：p1634-1648 外文作者 Kristine M. Kuhn 原文： Compensation as a signal of organizational culture: the effects of advertising individual or collective incentives Kristine M. Kuhn Compensation systems play a critical role in shaping organizational culture; they affect employee motivation, satisfaction, and behavior, and help determine perceptions of what an organization values. Compensation systems are also believed to affect culture (as well as performance) through self-selection of organizational members, with most existing research examining effects on retention. Less attention has been paid to how various compensation practices influence the recruitment of new members; most of the research that has been done has focused on recruits’ responses to pay levels or expected income. But compensation systems may also serve as a signal to potential applicants of the organization’s culture. Although there are many human resource policies and practices that shape and reflect organizational culture, compensation systems are a very salient organizational dimension that applicants are likely to be aware of at the time they make a job choice, and even casual viewers of recruiting advertisements are likely to attend to any information concerning pay. Spence’s (1974) signaling theory holds that that observable attributes are often perceived as indicators of less readily observable attributes. Rynes (1987) proposed that ‘compensation systems are capable of attracting (or repelling) the right kinds of people because they communicate so much about an organization’s philosophy, values, and practices’ (p. 190). To date, however, empirical evidence directly supporting this proposition remains sparse. The first research question