我国外资银行市场准入监管研究.pdfVIP

摘 要 随着我国银行业对外全面开放，外资银行纷踏而至，给外资银行监管提出 新的挑战。 本文以外资银行的风险特征为出发点，分析了我国外资银行市场准入的现 状，指出现阶段外资银行市场准入缺乏全面可靠的法理依据。本文将信息经 济学与经济学的成本收益理论结合起来，建立外资银行监管的成本收益分析 框架，就机构准入和业务准入两个方面，建立外资银行市场准入监管的完全 信息静态博弈模型、市场准入监管的不完全信息动态博弈模型和业务准入监 管的不完全信息条件动态博弈模型。通过分析得出：不同的阶段，政府对外 资银行有不同的战略定位，对外资银行进入形式和经营范围有不同的政策导 向。政府可以通过信息发布、调整监管的力度和效率来引导外资银行的进入 形式和进入新的业务领域。实证表明，除外贸易、投资等因素外，监管政策 是影响外资银行市场准入的重要因素，监管政策不仅影响外资银行的进入程 度，而且决定着外资银行的进入形式。 市场准入的政策方面，我国可以采用分级准入制度，采用区域引导政策， 建立和完善合资银行市场准入的法律和法规，为外资银行的合法经营提供法 律依据。 关键字：外资银行，市场准入，监管套利，资金跨国流动 I Abstract With the banking industry opening to the outside world, a lot of foreign banks enter the Chinese marketplace, which directly challenge Chinese supervision of foreign banks This paper starts from the risk characteristics of foreign banks, and then it analyzes supervision situation about foreign banks’ access, and come to a conclusion that there is short of legal basis on how to enter China for foreign capital banks. In this paper, the author combines information economics and classic cost-benefit economics theory, and then establishes foreign banks’ cost-benefit framework about supervision on foreign banks’ access, and then analyzes three theory model about market entrance and activity entry: static game of perfect information during foreign banks’ entry, dynamic game of imperfect information during foreign banks’ entry and activity entry, and conclude that on different stages foreign banks have different strategic positions from the government and they are confronted with diff