国有控股上市公司高管激励制度研究毕业论文.docVIP

毕业论文 （20_ _届） 国有控股上市公司高管激励制度研究 摘 要 现代企业制度下，企业所有权和经营权的分离，不可避免的产生了所有者与经营者之间的权力冲突。企业所有者追求的是剩余索取权，而高管人员追求的是自身效用的最大化。如何使企业高管人员以所有者的目标为自己的经营目标，合理行使自己的权力，积极谋求企业的发展，其关键在于建立一个完善的经营者激励约束机制。国有控股企业在我国上市公司中占有相当大的比例，发展我国社会主义市场经济，必须依靠国有控股企业发挥作用。随着国有控股企业改革的已经不断深入，薪酬激励制度作为现代公司治理结构的重要组成部分，已经成为我国国有控股企业特别是国有上市公司的重要内容。但是，长期以来，在国有控股企业产权改革中，薪酬激励制度却没有得到重视，缺乏对高管的激励机制是国有控股企业长期活力不足、效率低下的重要原因，薪酬激励机制缺陷也已成为我国国有控股企业改革深入的绊脚石，如何建立有效的薪酬激励制度，一直以来都是当今管理学研究的热点问题。 本文选取了国有控股上市公司为研究对象，运用委托代理理论、人力资本理论和理论等有关原理，对我国国有控股企业的薪酬制度的发展历史进行了脉络梳理，并分别从年薪制和股票期权制两方面进行了分析，。关键词国有控股上市公司高管人员 Abstract Business ownership and management rights are separated from company in modern enterprise system.It inevitably brings the conflict between the owners and operators.The pursuit of business owners is the residual claim,and the pursuit of managers is the utility maximization.How to make the goal of enterprise managers equals to the goal of owners in order to performing a reasonable power and actively seeking development.The key point is to establish a perfect incentive operator-binding mechanism. The state-owned enterprises hold a considerable Proportion in the listed companies in china.Pushing and developing the socialist market economy must be based on the state-owned enterprises,and these companies play an important role in the construction of the market economy.The reform of state-owned enterprises has been promoted persistently,as a great part of the corporate governance,the salary incentive mechanism,has become an important component of the listed enterprises especially the state-owned listed enterprises.However，for along time,in the reform of the Property rights of state-owned enterprises,the salary incentive system did not receive much attention,the lack of high-rank staff salary system is the main reason of insufficient,inefficiency of the state-owned enterprises,The disadvantages of salary incentive mechanism have become the stumbling block in China’s state-owned enterprises reform,how to establish a effective incentiv