银行危机和金融机构：一种生存时间分析外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 原文 Banking Crisis and Financial Structure: A Survival-time Analysis Material Source: International Review of Economics Finance, 2008(10):589-602 Author: J. Malcolm Dowling The effects of concentration and competitiveness in banking on the industrys fragility have been investigated in many studies, which have produced contradictory results. Some studies find an inverse relationship between the degree of bank concentration, excessive risk taking, and banking crisis in that higher degrees of concentration are associated with lower probability of bank crisis. Two explanations can be provided. First, if concentration promotes market power and therefore enhance bank profits, bank managers may be less willing to take excessive risk, which would reduce the probability of a bank crisis. Second, in a more concentrated banking system, the costs associated with monitoring and supervising banks may be lower, which is also expected to reduce the likelihood of systemic banking crises. Empirical studies on this issue emphasize the adverse effects of competition in the banking sector. It has been suggested that increases in competition caused bank charter values to decline in the early 1980s, which increased default risk through the increase in asset risk (Keeley, 1990). It has also been argued that there is a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced, risk-sensitive deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard; risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible deposit insurance cannot be implemented in a competitive, deregulated environment (Chan, Greenbaum, Thakor, 1992). Although competition among banks provides greater freedom in allocating assets, it can undermine prudent bank behavior by taking excessive risk or “gambling.” While regulations such as capital requirements may reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk, they also can harm banks franchise values and further encourage