内部资金分配和股权结构以韩国企业集团为例外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 原文 Internal Funds Allocation and the Ownership Structure:Evidence from Korean Business Groups Material Source: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Author: Byungmo Kim,Kooyul Jung Abstract. We examine the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and the funds transfer in the internal capital market within Korean business groups (chaebols) during the period from 1998 to 2001. We find that the funds allocation in the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights is better aligned with the investment opportunities and therefore, more efficient than in the firms where they have low cash flow rights. This effect is stronger when they have controlling powers large enough to expropriate minority shareholders. However, during the financial crisis period, funds simply move toward the firms where controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights. The results evidence the tunneling behavior in the internal capital market within a chaebol that the ownership structure distorts the allocation of internal funds in such a way as to benefit the controlling shareholders. Introduction Recently, many studies examined funds allocation in the internal capital market in the diversified companies in relation to the diversification discount. However, few studies examine the capital allocation behavior within the internal capital market. As evidence of the in efficient allocation behavior in the internal capital market, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (hereafter RSZ) (2000) suggest that internal power struggles between segment managers distort the allocation of resources when diversity in resources and opportunities are high. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that divisional rent seeking behavior by segment managers causes inefficient funds allocation in diversified firms. They call the fact that weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones as capital allocation socialism. In contrast to the inefficient aspect of the internal cap