对渔业资源私有化限制外文翻译.docVIP

外文翻译 原文 Limits to the Privatization of Fishery Resources Material Source: Ebsco Author: Colin W. Clark, Gordon R. Munro, and U. Rashid Sumaila The increasingly widespread implementation of harvesting rights schemes (or limited access privilege programs [LAPPs],to use American terminology), such as individual transferable quota (ITQ)schemes, territorial use rights in fisheries,and fisher cooperatives, has steadily increased the opportunity for private sector groups to influence fisheries management policy. This development, in turn, has given rise to a debate over the extent to which private sector influence over fisheries management. should be encouraged, with some authors implying that private sector management of the resource should be allowed to expand to the point that public sector oversight ceases to be significant (see, e.g.,Hannesson 2004; Arnason 2007). The private individual, or entity, would then be the owner of the resource, de facto, if not de jure. Other authors, however, argue that there are, in fact, strict limits to socially. optimal privatization of these resources. Authors such as Copes (1986), Copes and Charles (2004), and Macinko and Bromley (2002) have also addressed other weaknesses of privatizing fishery resources. In this paper, we focus sharply on the limits to socially optimal privatization of fishery resources, with the goal of contributing to the ongoing debate. To do this, we turn to the well-known result that, under certain circumstances, a private owner of a fishery resource could opt to drive there source to the brink of biological extinction, even in the absence of a positive minimum viable population (Clark 1973).This result is of particular interest, because a recent stimulating and provocative article in Science does, on the basis of empirical investigation of four fisheries, suggest that this result may be of little more than a theoretical curiosity, devoid of practical significance (Grafton, Kompa