Boghossiananalyticity 论分析性.pdfVIP

Paul Boghossian – “Analyticity” Main purpose: 1. Quine’s criticism did not undermine an epistemic notion of analyticity 2. to adopt the notion of Carnap-analyticity, rather then Frege-analyticity 3. The epistemic analyticity could explain the apriority of logical truth Belief, Knowledge, Apriority Quine’s thesis 1. no analytic-synthetic distinction 2. indeterminacy of translation - indeterminacy of meaning - meaning skepticism Two notion of analyticity 1. Metaphysical: because of S’s meaning, it is true (a fact) 2. Epistemic: merely grasping S’s meaning suffices for anyone to be justified in holding S true Reject metaphysical concept 1. S expressed C: what is expressed wouldn’t have been true at all, had it not been for the fact that S expressed C a. make all truth contingent b. make the truth of the claim expressed contingent on an act of meaning EX. either snow is white or it isn’t 2. motive: for reductive theory of necessity Epistemic concept 1. Frege-analytic: S is analytic - S is transformable into a logical truth by the substitution of synonyms of synonyms a. Logical truth - discussed later b. Synonymy - cannot be explained independently of what meaning is 2. What it apparently cannot explain a. Not transformable: p. 338 b. Trivially so transformable: truths of logic 3. Implicit definitions, Carnap-analytic Quine’s objection to Frege-analyticity 1. Two dogma; truth by convention Carnap and logical truth 2. Two theses: p.341 adopt NF, pp. 341-342 adopt ET* reductio of skepticism about Frege-analyticity a. Non-factualism: no determinate property i. No fact as to whether it is transformable into a logical truth by substitution of synonyms ii. Against against synonymy: make no sense that A