VoteTradingGamesintheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil.docVIP

Erasmus University Rotterdam Erasmus School of Economics Vote Trading Games in the United Nations Security Council A Game-theoretic analysis of the United Nations Security Council Decision Making Process and Reform Master Thesis Author: Joost Burggraaf Student Number: 325948 Supervisor: S. Renes, Msc. Study Program: Business Economics Master Specialization: Economics of Markets, Organizations and Policy Abstract After the inability to intervene in Syrian civil war, the debate about reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been revived. This thesis investigates the voting behavior in the UNSC using a game-theoric model including vote trading. Results show that, whenever possible, voters are more concerned with buying winning coalitions than with maximizing global welfare. Veto members are the most important determinants of the outcome of votes with and without vote trading due to their disproportionate power. It is shown that a trade-off between performance and vote trading exists: increasing performance increases vote trading and vice versa. It is discussed that the optimal reform is to reduce the disproportionate power of the veto by reducing it to an 80% qualified majority rule. Additionally, the number of non-permanent seats may be increased. Acknowledgement I would like to thank my supervisor Sander Renes for his counsel and, not the least, his patience with me. Also, I am deeply grateful for my friends who put me back on the studying path when I was about to let my head down, and listen to my rantings about the Security Council. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and sister who have supported me always along the way. Finally, the master study has come full circle and I am very glad and proud that I have made it with all your help. Table of contents Table of contents 4 Introduction 5 2. Background Security Council 7 2.1 Structure UNSC 7 2.2 Performance 8 3. Literature 10 3.1 Forms of Vote Trading 10 3.2 Literature overview 11 3.3