纵向市场结构与买方抗衡势力研究.docVIP

2009年中国经济学年会“产业组织”专场投稿 纵向市场结构与买方抗衡势力研究( 吴绪亮 （东北财经大学 产业组织与企业组织研究中心， 辽宁 大连 116025） 摘 要：本文重新界定双重垄断、双边垄断、双侧垄断等不同类型的纵向市场结构，考察当存在双边垄断的时候，在双侧垄断与单侧垄断竞争格局下零售商买方垄断势力日益增长的福利后果有何不同。研究发现，在双侧垄断情形下，从消费者福利角度考虑，纵向一体化结果优于纵向分离结果，而在单侧垄断的情形下，纵向分离结果则反过来优于纵向一体化结果，因此单侧垄断（或者说单侧竞争）的纵向市场结构有效地克服了双重加价问题，此时买方抗衡势力假说有一定的说服力。考虑到跨期因素，这一结论尤为可信。 关键词：纵向市场结构；买方抗衡势力；双侧垄断；反垄断法 On Vertical Market Structure and Buyer Countervailing Power WU Xuliang (Center for Industrial and Business Organization, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China) Abstract: The paper redefines different types of vertical market structure, such as double monopoly, bilateral monopoly, and two-sided monopoly. The core issue can be stated as follows: When there is bilateral monopoly, what are the differences between two-sided monopoly and one-sided monopoly as far as welfare consequences of retailers’ rising buyer power are concerned. The results show that in tow-sided monopoly situation, from consumer welfare perspective, the results of vertical integration are better than the results of vertical separation, whereas in one-sided monopoly situation, the results of vertical separation are better than the results of vertical integration, so the vertical market structure of one-sided monopoly or one-sided competition effectively overcomes double marginalization problem, to counter the forces at this time the buyer countervailing power hypothesis is somewhat reasonable. Taking Inter-period factor into account, this conclusion is even more credible. Key Words: Vertical Market Structure; Buyer Countervailing Power; Two-sided Monopoly; Antitrust Law 纵向市场结构与买方抗衡势力研究 一、引言 约翰·肯尼思·加尔布雷斯（John Kenneth Galbraith）[1]1952年的名著——《美国资本主义：抗衡势力的概念》提出可以通过一种垄断势力来中和另外一种垄断势力。加尔布雷斯把这种可以中和卖方垄断势力的买方垄断势力称为买方抗衡势力（buyer countervailing power），因此这一天才地思想被称作“买方抗衡势力假说”，有时也被称为“加尔布雷斯假说”。加尔布雷斯认为，抗衡势力的一个非常重要的例子就是大型零售组织的兴起。通过行使抗衡势力，这些强有力的零售商能够降低它们付给供货商的价格，并且把这种成本的节约传递给消费者。加尔布雷斯据此认为，这些大型零售商“是单个消费者的代理人”。因而，这样的抗衡势力对社会是有益的。 买方抗衡势力假说刚提出的时候并没有多少理论支撑，因此受到许多