pseudonym-based rfid discovery service to mitigate.pptVIP

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2016-03-05 发布于广东
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pseudonym-based rfid discovery service to mitigate.ppt

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pseudonym-based rfid discovery service to mitigate

Mitigate Unauthorized Tracking in RFID Discovery Service Qiang Yan1, Robert H. Deng1, Zheng Yan2, Yingjiu Li1, Tieyan Li3 1Singapore Management University, Singapore 2Nokia Research Center, Finland 3Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore September 2010 Outline Background Motivation Discovery Service based Tracking Attack Pseudonym-based Design Basic ideas Scheme I: supporting flexible tag level tracking Scheme II: supporting user revocation Conclusion Anti-tracking problem in EPCglobal RFID architecture 1. Tag information (e.g. EPC code, …) 2. Location query by unique identifier e.g. EPC code 3. Location information of associated IS servers 4. Request for processing current tags 5. Response of processing request 6. Update tag if necessary Most of research works assume discovery service is trusted and focus on secure protocol design to defend unauthorized tracking at the physical level. It could be easier for an attacker to track information flow at the system level, e.g. from a compromised DS server. DS is designed to be a restricted-access search engine. But it is still possible to compromise a DS server deployed on the Internet. RFID discovery service enables tag-level tracking in EPCglobal Network * Tags are transported from Partner A to Partner B Authorized User 1.Publish: (EPC1, L1, T1) … 2.Publish: (EPC1, L2, T2) … 3.Query: EPC1 4.Reply: (L1, T1, L2, T2, …) Supply Chain Partner A Supply Chain Partner B (EPC1, L1, T1) (EPC1, L2, T2) … Discovery Service Database Records on Discovery Service: Unauthorized tracking by RFID discovery service through tag identifier grouping Tag ID Location Time EPC1 L1 … EPC1 L2 … EPC2 L1 … The adversary knows: A tag with tag ID EPC1 was transported from L1 to L2. Database Table Unauthorized tracking by RFID discovery service through timestamp correlating Tag ID Location Time P1 L1 T1 P2 L1 T1 P3 L2 T2 P4 L2 T2 Database Table The adversary knows: A batch of two tags with pseudonyms P1, P2, P3, and P4 may have been transported