垂直市场的三度格歧视.pdf

摘 要 对三级价格歧视理论进行了系统的数理经济分析，在定量分析的基础上，并运 用博弈论的方法进行分析计算，给出了一些定性的结论。本文建立的模型考虑的是 垄断生产商和零售商，并把两个需求弹性不同的地区作为两个不同的市场，研究了 三度价格歧视的方法和特点。具体有：第一，首先进行无价格歧视的研究即对两个 地区实行统一的价格，以便与后面的研究进行比较；第二，在线性需求函数条件下 研究了一个生产商和一个零售商就三度价格歧视的完全且完美信息的动态博弈,并 计算出生产商、零售商的利润和消费者剩余；第三，在线性需求函数条件下研究了 一个生产商和两寡头零售商多方博弈，生产商和零售商，两个零售商之间分别是完 全且完美信息的动态博弈；并进一步扩展到n 个零售商的情形，更好地说明了竞争增 强所带来的社会福利的变化；第四，考虑生产商和零售商之间进行合作策略的情形， 并把这几种情况下生产商和零售商的利润，消费者剩余进行比较。其结果有三：第 一，实行三度价格歧视并不一定比实行统一价格的社会福利差；第二，竞争性强的 市场，消费者剩余较多，零售商利润较少；而垄断性强的市场，消费者剩余较少， 零售商利润较多。第三，生产商和零售商实行合作战略时生产者和零售商的利润多， 消费者剩余也多。 关键词：三级价格歧视 博弈 福利 合作 竞争 IV Abstract A systematic mathematics analysis (game theory)was presented on third -degree price discrimination. On the basis of quantitative analysis, we got some qualitative conclusions. What the model of this text consider is monopolist and dealer in two different markets of two regions with different demand elasticity.We studied the method and characteristics of third-degree price discrimination . The concrete contents is as follows: Firstly,We studied it without price discrimination , Namely the price of two regions are same, in order to compare it with next Situations; Secondly,We studied and compared the dynamic games of monopolist and a dealer on third-degree price discrimination under the condition of linear demand functions, and compute the profits of monopolist and a dealer ;Thirdly,We studied and compared the complete and perfect information dynamic games of monopolist and oligarchic dealer on third-degree price discrimination under the condition of linear demand functions, producer and dealers ,dealer 1 and dealer 2 are both complete and perfect information dynamic game; and it expands further to the situation of n dealers,