基于回收努力程度的逆向供应链激励机制设计.pdf

2009 2 23 2( 110) 王文宾, 达庆利 (东南大学 经济管理学院, 南京 211189) : , : , , ; , ; : ; ; ; ; : F252 : A : 1001- 8409( 2009) 02- 0125- 05 Design of the Incenti eM echan ism for the Re erse Supply Chain Based on Collection Effort Degree WANG W enbin, DA Q ingli (School of E conom ics andManagem ent, Southeast University, N anj ing 211189) Abstra ct: This paper stud ies the design of incenti e mechanisms applying the principal- agent theory for the rea son of the difficulty about contracting the co llection effort. The differences of incenti e mechanism w ith information symm etry and asymmetry are discussed and compared respect i ely. The results show that the collector not only gains the fixed income but also gains the risk compensation and bears the sam e proport ion of the risk w ith inform a tion asymm etry; how e er, the collector only gains the fixed income w ith inform at ion symm etry. Secondly, the col lectors expected benefit is the sam e in both cases; in contrast, themanufacturers expected benefit is lower w ith in formation asymm etry. T hirdly, the m anufacturer should pay attention to the agent cost s influence factors and should balance the agent cost and the super ising cost. K ey w ords: re erse supply cha in; collection effort degree; incenti e m echanism; risk; principal- agent 1 Stackelberg [ 4] ; Gu id , Jr V D R, Teunter R H, V