Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions-英文文献.pdfVIP

Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions Author(s): Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman Source: The Journal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory (Oct., 1986), pp. S251-S278 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: /stable/2352759 Accessed: 10/09/2008 09:33 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available at /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at /action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. Amos Tversky Stanford University Daniel Kahneman University of British Columbia Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions* The moderntheory of decision makingunderrisk Alternativedescrip- emerged from a logical analysis of games of tions of a decision chance ratherthanfrom a psychologicalanalysis problemoften give rise of risk andvalue. The theorywas conceived as a