基于小世界网络博弈的空港联盟准入算法.pdfVIP

系统工程学报 第 30 卷第 1 期 Vol.30 No .1 2015 年2 月 JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS ENG卧ffiERING Feb. 2015 基于小世界网络博弈的空港联盟准入算法 崔强，匡海波 (大连海事大学交通运输管理学院，辽宁大连 116026) 摘要:针对联盟的空港在面临联盟入侵者时的准入决策问题进行了研究，认为众空港在博弈中的收益为不等佳，从 区域发展、生产要素、需求状况、支撑产业和环境影响五方面建立空港联盟收益的指标体系，将空港网络抽象成小 世界网络，结合煽值TOPSIS和小世界网络博弈动力学建立空港联盟准入算法，并且运用2011年我国25个空港的实 证数据进行研究.相比于申请进入联盟的大空港，现有空港联盟更加欢迎申请进入联盟的中小空港.当连续两个大 空港申请进入联盟时且第一个被拒绝时，第二个大空港进入联盟的概率非常大. 关键词:空港联盟;准入;博弈动力学 中图分类号: F562止TB114.1 文献标识码:A 文章编号:10∞-5781(2015)01 删1-08 doi: 1O.13383/j.c此i.jse.2015.01.001 Airport alliance access algorithm through the game on small-world network Cui Qiang, Kuang Haibo (Transportation Management College, Dalian Maritime Univers坷， Dalian 116026, China) Abstract:ηle goa1 of this paper is to study 由巳 decision-making problem for airports in alliance when there are a1 1iance invaders. It is supposed that a1 1iance game benefits of airports are not s缸ne. Game benefit eva1uation index system is built from the aspects of regiona1 development, production factors , demand conditions , support indus町and environmenta1 effect. Then an 创甲ort network is abstracted as a sma1 1-world network. Airport alliance access decision-making problem is studied through g缸ne dynarnics model based on a sma1 1-world network and entropy TOPSIS a1gorithm. Then an empirica1 study is done based on the data of 25 Chinese airports in 201 1. Compared with big invader airports , an a坤ort alliance is more inclined to accept sma1 1 invad