旅游景区环境保护博弈分析.pdfVIP

安徽农业科学，Journal of Anhui A伊. Sci.201I ， 39(33):2ω∞-2悦。1 ， 20610 责任编辑朱嘉责任校对李岩 旅游景区环境保护博弈分析 吴艳l ，宋健峰2 (1. 河海大学商学院，江苏南京 21∞98;2. 西北农林科技大学经济管理学院，陕西杨凌 7山∞) 摘要 通过建立旅游景区环境保护博弈模型，对一次性博弈和无限次重复博弈的均衡进行分析，揭示旅游景区坏境破坏的动园，并提出 确保博弈停留在均衡状态的对策。研究发现:游客和经营商在一次性博弈中，不治理环境是经营商的占优策略，结果导教旅游景区环境 的破坏。在游客和经营商的无限;大重复博弈中，中自累托最优均衡(游客选择旅游，经营商选择治理环境)的实现，依赖于参与方(游客或 经营商)对触发策略(旅游或治理环境)的选择。政府对经营商的监管可以强行促使其治理环境，从而改造博弈均衡的效率，实现旅游景 区的环境保护和旅游业的可持续发展。 关键词旅游;环境保护:一次性博弈;重复博弈 中图分类号 F592 文献析、识码 A 文章编号 0517 -6611 (2011 )33-氢汹汹-但 The Game Analysis or Environmental Protection at Scenic Sp。但 WU Yan et aI (Bu,iness Schoο1 of Hohai University. Nanjing , Jiangsu 21仪阴) Abstract Game model of environmental proleclion al ACenic spolS is established in this paper in order 10 carηout analysis of the balance be- tween one-time game and infinitely repealed game. disclose the 陀aso.阳 why Ihe environmenl of 町enic spots are destroyed , and propo酷 the countermeas盯es to ensure the equilibrium of the game. The sludy also reveals that during the one-time game between touri由 and lour opera- tors , it is tour operato阳， dominant strategy not to control environmental pollution that leads ωIhe destruction of environment at scenic spo恼­ While , during the infinitely repeated game between tourists and to町 operato四， the realization of Pareto optimality e甲ilibrium (节le strategy of tourist is traveling , and the slrategy of tour operato四 are controlling environmental pollution) is dependent upon the choice of players (Iourists or operators) of triggering stralegy (traveling or controlling environmental pollulion). The supervision of the govemment upon operators can 岛rce them to control environmental pollution. which can consequently improve the efficíency of equilibrium in the 萨me ，四d promote environ- mental