旧城更新拆迁博弈中的帕累托最优悖论解析.pdfVIP

RZJ!ι自 旧城更新拆迁博弈中的帕累托最优悖论 解析 口张杰，庞骏，朱金华 [摘 !I]通过对旧城拆迁博鼻群体、博弈方式及博弈结果的分析可知，拆迁制度内容上的种种满缺导致了拆迁 制度在现实中的失效，这是旧城拆迁过程中形成帕累托最优悖论的根源，而权力高度垄断的地方政府所形成的 划桨与掌舵双重身份的含一促使了悖论的发展。在旧城更新拆迁博弈中噜地方政府及开发商都得到了可 观的利益，并且他们利益的增加不少于被拆迁入利益的损失。基于此，在制度层面上，应加强《城市房雇拆迁 法》的立法，修正与完善拆迁补偿制度，辈辈构讨价还价的契约协商机制;在政府管理展商上，建议政府行政权 力退出非公撤性拆迁，实现政府戈IJ 桨与掌舵的分离. [关键词]旧城更新;拆迁;博弈;悻论 [文章编号]1006四0022 (2008) 09-0084叩05 [中固分提号]TU984.11吟 [文献标识码]8 节1e Pareto Optimality Paradox in Hístoric Dí由ict RenovationlZhang Jíe, Pang Jun ,ZhuJínhua IAbs刷刷Analysis shows that a Pareto optim创ity paradox occurs in historic district renovation when the economic benefits of such renovations are inefficiently distributed due to defects in the demolition ∞mpensation system. The paradoxis 仙eled by the power monopoly of 10四1 governments beωusethey ∞ntrol both the motive and directive forces of such renovations. When historic districts are renovated local governments and developers make considerable profits while the displaced homeowners suffer financiallosses 什om inadequate reparations. New legislation for demolition compensation is needed and should include provisions for the negotiation of∞mpensation payments. Local govemments should cease for-profit renovations and the motive and directive power for such renovations should not be held by the same administrative body. 跚跚跚W削Historic district renovation ,Demolition,Game,Paradox 1.1.2 博碎群体及其关联 1 悖论的提出 博弈是描决策主体的行为发生直接的相互作用 1. 1 参与群体的博弈