基于重复博弈的Ad hoc 网络合作转发模型 - 电子与信息学报.PDF

第 36 卷第 3 期 电 子 与 信 息 学 报 Vol.36 No.3 2014 年 3 月 Journal of Electronics Information Technology Mar. 2014 基于重复博弈的 Ad hoc 网络合作转发模型 张华鹏 张宏斌* (苏州大学计算机科学与技术学院 苏州 215006) 摘 要：针对噪音环境下的 Ad hoc 网络合作问题，运用不完美信息重复博弈模型分析节点之间的交互过程，使用 贝尔曼方程构造满足序贯均衡的合作激励机制。对于该机制，节点间无需交换观察信息，节省了节点能量和网络负 担。与已有的序贯均衡策略相比，该机制避免使用对观测误差敏感的触发策略，提高了不完美信息环境下网络的合 作率和节点的平均收益。仿真结果表明，使用贝尔曼方程构造的序贯均衡策略既提高了网络的合作率，又有很好的 适应性。 关键词：Ad hoc；不完美信息；重复博弈；序贯均衡；合作 中图分类号：TP393 文献标识码： A 文章编号：1009-5896(2014)03-0703-05 DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1146.2013.00559 Cooperative Forwarding Model Based on Repeated Game in Ad hoc Networks Zhang Hua-peng Zhang Hong-bin (School of Computer Science Technology, Soochow University, Suzhou 215006, China) Abstract: To motivate nodes to forward packets in Ad hoc networks under the condition of imperfect information, repeated game is often used to model the process of sequential interactions between nodes and the Bellman equations is applied to design strategy based on sequential equilibrium. The nodes need not to exchange their monitor information, so it saves nodes’ energy and reduces the network burden. Compared with existing sequential equilibrium strategy, since the proposed strategy does not use trigger mechanism, which is sensible to observation error, it improves the cooperation rate and the average benefits of networks with imperfect information. Simulation compares the performance of two sequential equilibrium strategies. The results indicate that the proposed strategy not only improves the cooperation rate, but also has a good adaptability. Key words: Ad hoc; Imperfect information; Repeated game; Sequential equilibri