供应链环境下考虑双边道德风险客户知识协同获取契约设计.docVIP

供应链环境下考虑双边道德风险客户知识协同获取契约设计摘 要：本文研究了供应链环境下面临双边道德风险时制造商与零售商协同获取客户知识的契约设计问题。首先分析了制造商与零售商协同获取客户知识的双边道德风险与客户知识绩效，然后运用委托代理理论建立了合作契约模型并得出结论：客户知识协同获取的最优收益分享比例与制造商和零售商的努力及其成本系数无关，但与他们的努力弹性系数及其成本函数的指数相关；当制造商增加努力对客户知识获取绩效贡献较大时，制造商将分配给自己较大的收益份额，而当零售商增加努力对客户知识获取绩效贡献更大时，制造商将给零售商较高的收益分享比例，这激励了双方合作，降低了双边道德风险。最后，通过实例进一步说明了契约设计及其变量之间的关系。 关键词：客户知识获取；协同；道德风险；供应链 中图分类号：F274 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1003-5192(2011)04-0020-05 Contract on Customer Knowledge Collaborative Capture Based onDouble-sided Moral Hazard in Supply Chain ZHANG Xu-mei, SHEN Na-li, DENG Liu-sheng （College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China） Abstract:Contract on customer knowledge collaborative acquisition for manufacturer and retailer with double-sided moral hazard was researched. First, double-sided moral hazard in process of customer knowledge collaborative acquisition was analyzed and effects of different efforts as well as their coefficients of elasticity were considered to construct customer knowledge performance function. Then, cooperation contract was designed through building mathematic model with principle-agent theory. The results showed that the optimal revenue sharing rate of customer knowledge collaborative acquisition was not relative with efforts of manufacturer and retailer and their cost-of-effort coefficient, while relative with effort-elasticity and exponents of cost-of-effort functions. The results also explored that when manufacturer?s efforts contributed more for customer knowledge acquisition, she will share more revenue to give itself incentive; when retailer?s efforts contributed more, manufacturer will let him share more revenue for incentive; this incentive mechanism decreased the double-sided moral hazard. Finally, a numerical example showed furtherly the contract design and relationships between its variables. Key words:customer knowledge acquisition; collaboration; moral hazard; supply chain 1 引言 知识经济时代，知识已经成为推动经济发展的一个决定性