the stability of hedonic coalition structures（享乐主义联盟的稳定结构）.pdfVIP

The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures Anna Bogomolnaia and Matthew O Jackson April This Revision January Forthcoming Games and Economic Beha vior Abstract We consider the partitioning of a so ciety into coalitions in purely hedonic settings ie where each players payo is completely determined by the identity of other memb ers of her coalition We rst discuss how hedonic and nonhedonic settings dier and some sucient conditions for the existence of core stable coali tion partitions in hedonic settings We then fo cus on a weaker stability condi tion individual stability where no player can b enet from moving to another coalition while not hurting the memb ers of that new coalition We show that if coalitions can b e ordered according to some characteristic over which players have singlep eaked preferences or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences then there exists an individually stable coalition partition Examples show that without these conditions individual ly stable coalition par titions may not exist We also discuss some other stability concepts and the incompatibility of stability with other normative prop erties Keywords Hedonic Game Coalition Individual Stability Co op erative Game JEL Classication Numb ers C A D  Bogomolnaia is at the Department of Economics POBox Southern Metho dist Univer sity Dallas Texas USA annabmailsmuedu Jackson is at the division of Humanities and So cial Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena California USA jack sonmhsscaltechedu Financial supp ort under NSF grant SBR