why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects（为什么公司使用没有激励效应的激励）.pdfVIP

This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 02-06 Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects? By Paul Oyer Stanford University December 2002 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 (650) 725-1874 The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on economic and public policy issues. The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute. Working papers in this series reflect the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research or Stanford University. Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?∗ Paul Oyer Stanford University Graduate School of Business December 2002 Abstract This paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward “luck.” I consider a model where adjusting