风险厌恶下的重大工程供应商培育激励机制分析.PDFVIP

第32 卷第3 期 系统工 程 学 报 Vol.32 No.3 2017 年6 月 JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING Jun. 2017 风险厌恶下的重大工程供应商培育激励机制分析 鄢冬瑾, 曾 伟, 王红卫 (华中科技大学自动化学院, 湖北武汉430074) 摘要: 针对风险中性业主和风险厌恶供应商组成的两级工程供应链, 研究重大工程供应商培育的激励机制, 包括 投资成本分担和采购价格激励两种激励方式. 根据工程业主的主导地位, 分别建立供应商培育的委托代理模型 和Stackelberg 博弈模型. 研究表明, 委托代理模型中最优质量水平更高, 供应链的总期望效用更大, 采购价格激励 和投资成本分担均能促进供应商提升质量水平, 且投资成本分担比采购价格激励对质量水平的影响更大, 供应商生 产成本与质量提升成负相关, 供应商风险承受水平与质量提升成正相关, 未来市场需求与质量提升成正相关. 关键词: 重大工程; 供应商培育; 风险; 激励机制 中图分类号: TP273 文献标识码: A 文章编号:2017 doi: 10.13383/ki.jse.2017.03.004 Analysis of incentive mechanism for supplier development with a risk-averse supplier in mega construction project Yan Dongjin, Zeng Wei, Wang Hongwei (Huazhong University of Science Technology, Wuhan 430074, China) Abstract: This paper investigates the incentive mechanisms for supplier development in a construction supply chain that consists of a risk-neutral owner and a risk-averse supplier. Two commonly used incentive methods, including purchase price incentive and cost sharing, are studied. Considering the owner’s dominant position, a principal-agent model and a Stackelberg game model are proposed. It shows that the optimal quality and the total utility of the supply chain in the principal-agent model are higher. Both the purchasing price incentive and cost sharing can promote the supplier to improve the quality level, and the impact of cost sharing on quality improvement is greater. Quality improvement has a negative correlation with the supplier’s production cost, and the supplier’s risk tolerance level and the market demand have positive correlations with quality improvement. Ke