Turning the Trolley LiU IEI（把电车刘迅速）.pdfVIP

JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON Turning the Trolley i The trolley problem is by now thoroughly familiar, but it pays to begin with a description of its origins. In “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,” Philippa Foot described a variety of hypothetical cases, in some of which we regard it as permissible for the agent to act, in others of which we regard it as impermissible for the agent to act, and she asked the good question what explains the differences among our verdicts about them.1 Her aim was to assess whether the Doctrine of Double Effect provides a plausible answer. She concluded that it doesn’t, and went on to offer an answer of her own. It is her own answer that will interest us. Here are two of her hypothetical cases. In the first, which I will call Judge’s Two Options, a crime has been committed, and some rioters have taken five innocent people hostage; they will kill the five unless the judge arranges for the trial, followed by the execution, of the culprit. The real culprit is unknown, however. So the judge has only two options: Judge’s Two Options: he can (i) let the rioters kill the five hostages, or (ii) frame an innocent person for the crime, and have him executed. What follows is a revised version of the keynote address I gave at the USC/UCLA Philosophy Graduate Student Conference on February 9, 2008. An earlier version was presented at a conference on issues in philosophy and psychology, held at MIT on May 23, 2007. I am indebted to the participants on both occasions for comments and criticism. I owe thanks also to the Editors of Philosophy Public Affairs for helpful suggestions. 1. Foot’s article was first published in the Oxford Review in 1967; it is reprinted in her collection Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978). ©