风险投资代理冲突影响因素及解决机制的研究.pdfVIP

Abstract Over the past decade in the 21st century, an unprecedented rapid development has taken place all over the world. Technical progress has become more clearly than before an important factor in determing a nations economic and overall development. As a major funding source for start-ups, Venture Capital plays an increasingly important role in promoting technical achievements into real productivity, thus becoming the key of a nation’s economic development. This paper analyzes three main factors which influence the agency conflicts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs by mixedly using the principle of Transaction Cost Economics, Incomplete Contracting Theory and Principal-agent Theory. The three factors are asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transaction. Then we come up with four coping mechanisms of the agency conflicts: vesting, staged financing, investment syndication, participation. At last, we prove the factors and coping mechanisms though the analysis of several real cases. We hope conclusions of this study can have a little help to the theoretical and practical research of venture capital. Keywords ：Venture Capital, Agency Conflicts, Transaction Cost Economics, Incomplete Contracting Theory II 目录 第1 章 引言1 1.1 研究背景 1 1.2 风险投资的发展 1 1.3 研究意义、研究内容和创新点以及结构安排 3 1.3.1研究意义 3 1.3.2研究内容和创新点 4 1.3.3 本文结构安排 4 第2 章 文献评述5 2.1 交易成本经济学与风险投资 5 2.2 不完全契约理论与风险投资 6 2.3 委托代理理论与风险投资 8 第3 章 理论依据与理论框架 11 3.1 风险投资 11 3.1.1VC 与PE 11 3.1.2 风险投资的概念 11 3.1.3 风险投资的特点 11 3.