Amos Tversky Daniel Kahneman Probabilistic Reasoning behavioral英文电子书.pdfVIP

Probabilistic Reasoning Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman Judgmentunder Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of un- certain events such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defen- dant, or the future value of the dollar. These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as 1 think that . . ., chances are . . ., it is unlikely that . . ., and so forth. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form as odds or subjective probabilities. What determines such beliefs? How do people assess the probability of an uncertain event or the value of an uncertain quantity? This article shows that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complextasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and sys- tematic errors. The subjective assessment of probability resembles the subjective assessment of physical quantities such as distance or size. These judg- ments are all based on data of limited validity, which are processed according to heuristic rules. For example, the apparent distance of an object is determined in part by its clarity. The more sharply the object is seen, the closer it appears to be. This rule has some validity, because in any given scene the more distant objects are seen less sharply than nearer objects. However, the reliance on this rule leads to systematic errors in the estimation of distance. Specifically, distances are often overestimated when visibility is poor because the contours of objects are blurred. On the other hand, distances are often underestimated when visibility is good because the objects are seen sharply. Thus, the reliance on clarity as an indication of distance leads to common biases. First half from A. Tversky an