高级微观经济学 Part 3_Partial Equilibrium Theory Ⅱ.pptVIP

lecture5 for Chu Kechen Honors College Advanced Microeconomics(Partial Equilibrium Theory Ⅱ) Game Theory (Relate to this part) Complete information static game Complete information dynamic game Stackelberg Model Cournot Model Bertrand Model Complete information static game Dominant strategy: No matter the other players choose which strategies, his optimum choice is unique. Example 1: Prisoners’ dilemma Example 2: Boxed pigs Example 3: Battle of the sexes Example 4: Chicken game Example 5: Entry deterrence Nash Equilibrium : In the strategy game , strategy profile composes the Nash equilibrium. If for all the players , and all , we can get: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: Mixed strategy profile composes the Nash equilibrium of the game , if for every , and all , we can get: Stackelberg Model Player 1 choose strategy from action or strategy set . Player 2 has observed the player 1’s choice, choose strategy from action or strategy set . The two players’ income are and . Solve: Reverse induction Player 2 maximizes his object function: Given the optimum solution is . Player 1 has considered player 2’s response, maximize his object function. Given the optimum solution is . Then take it to , we can get: Nash equilibrium is . Cournot Model Firms amounts: J The same cost function: Demand function: Game statement Players set: Strategy set: Firm j, profit : Solve Nash equilibrium: Given is Nash equilibrium, we have The first-order condition: Bertrand Model Firms amounts: 2. Cost function: Demand function: Game statement Players set: Strategy set: Player 1’s income function: Nash equilibrium: (c, c) Income: (0, 0) Proof: ① (c, c) is Nash equilibrium. Given firm 2 keeps