代理人还是管家基于博弈论的企业经理人努力水平与角色行为选择分析.doc

代理人还是管家:基于博弈论的企业经 理人努力水平与角色行为选择分析 李海东 景德镇陶瓷大学管理与经济学院 代理理论与管家理论对经理人的角色和努力水平有着相互对立的认知。在现实屮, 单从一个理论视角无法全而刻画经理人的角色行为选择和绩效水平，因此，有 必耍整合代理理论与管家理论，探讨影响经理人角色行为选择的影响因素。基于 傅弈论的分析结果表明，企业所有者给予经理人的激励性薪酬K有充分的竞争 力时，将极大地提高经理人的努力程度;在经理人表现出管家行为时，企业所有 者给予经理人分享努力绩效的机会将有助于提升经理人的努力水平，促进企业 所有者的效用最大化。在代理理论情形下，企业所有荠与经理人之间存在着混合 策略纳什均衡;而在管家理论情形下，企业所有者与经理人之间存在着纯策略纳 什均衡，有助于最大程度地降低代理成木，实现两者互利双赢。 关键词： 代理人;管家;努力水平;角色行为; 李海东(1981-)，男，内蒙古赤峰人。副教授，，主要从事组 织管理理论方向研宄。 2016-11 -21 基金：2015年教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“基于动因视角的企业员 工管家行为研宂:形成机制与影响” (15YJC630054) Agent or Steward: An Analysis of Choices of Managers Effort Level and Role Behavior Based on Game Theory Li Hai-dong School of Management and Economy， Jingdezhen Ceramic Institute; Abstract： There is a conflicting cognition of manager’s role and his effort level between agency theory and stewardship theory. In reality, a single theoretical perspective cannot fully portray the role choice and performance level of the manager. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate agency theory and stewardship theory to explore the factors that influence the role behavior selection of the manager. Based on the game theory, the results suggest that when the incentive pay is sufficiently competitive, the enterprise owners can greatly improve the degree of manager’s effort. At the same time, when the manager shows stewardship behavior, the opportunity to share the fruits of the efforts can improve the manager’s effort level，and promote the utility maximization of enterprise owners. In the case of agency theory, there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium between owners and managers, while in stewardship theory, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium between owners and managers, and this equilibrium can help minimize agency costs and achieve a mutually beneficial relationship between both parties. Keyword： Agent; steward; effort level; role behavior; Received： 2016-11-21 R前很多民营企业或者家族企业为Y实现可持续发展的A标，纷纷把职业经理 人引入企业，并将企业的资产控制权和经营决策权分配给职业经理人，形成了 复杂的“委托-代理”关系。企业所有者对职业经理人的人性假设认知在一定程 度上