Inertia and Incentives Bridging Organizational Economics and Organizational Theory[文献翻译].docVIP

外文文献翻译译文 外文原文 原文： Inertia and Incentives: Bridging Organizational Economics and Organizational Theory Kaplan Sarah，Henderson Rebecca For a ?rm to be able to derive the “optimal” contract, a great deal of knowledge has to be in place— and known to everyone on both sides of the contract. Managers need to understand what the possible set of actions is, how enjoyable or costly these actions are going to be for the individual employee, and the link between these actions and useful output. Then they need to be able to design a relational contract between the ?rm and the employees that will persuade the employees that the ?rm will honor such a promise. In a world of perfect information in which new relational contracts can be simply announced, this would not, of course, be a problem— but in the messy world of a real organization, it is likely to be very dif?cult indeed. The development of new incentives regimes under these conditions faces three separate but interrelated problems— uncertainty around incentives, uncertainty around the task, and the dif?culties inherent in structuring credible new incentives. While these challenges are present for any ?rm in a new arena, we suggest that established ?rms face particular hurdles not salient to startups. Consider ?rst those challenges that all ?rms face. First, identifying exactly what an employee is likely to do without being paid to do it, or what his or her true interests are, is, in practice, a complicated task even for the individual employee. Putting to one side the important but thorny question of intrinsic motivation, as the ?eld work reported on in Kaplan suggests, actors may have multiple interests that run from the tangibly bene?cial to the more intangible bene?cial. These interests are subject to interpretation even by the employee. Moreover, individuals’ interests may evolve over time as they gain experience, move into new positions, belong to different organizational groups, and respond to changed incentive struct