金字塔式控股结构上市公司过度投资分析——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据-analysis of overinvestment of listed companies with pyramid holding structure - empirical evidence from private listed companies in china.docxVIP

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金字塔式控股结构上市公司过度投资分析——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据-analysis of overinvestment of listed companies with pyramid holding structure - empirical evidence from private listed companies in china.docx

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金字塔式控股结构上市公司过度投资分析——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据-analysis of overinvestment of listed companies with pyramid holding structure - empirical evidence from private listed companies in china

RESARCHONOVERINVESTMENTINLISTEDCOMPANIESWITHPYRAMIDALHOLDINGSTRUCTURE——BASEDONEMPIRICALEVIDENCEFROMPRIVATELISTEDCOMPANYINCHINAABSTRACTInmoderntimes,ithasbecomeanormalphenomenonthattheownership structuresoftheenterprisesarerelativelyconcentratedaroundtheworld.Along withtheequityconcentration,aninterestconflictbetweenlargeshareholders andsmallmedium-sizedonescomeintobeing,whichbecomesthemain corporategovernanceprobleminsteadoftheconflictbetweenmanagementand theownersintheequityhighlydecentralizedstate.Especially,thecapitaland enterprisescaleexpansionleadtoaphenomenonthatabigshareholdercontrols severalcompanies.Bigshareholders,theso-calledultimatecontrollers,usually adoptpyramid-shapedstructuretoimplementthecontrol,sotheircontrolrights inthebottomcompaniesoftenexceedsthecashflowrights,formingexcess control,whichmakes theultimatecontrollersmorecapabletoencroachonsmallmedium-sizedshareholders,andthusintensifiestheinterestconflictbetween themandgeneratescorrespondingagencycost,andmanipulatingthebottom companiestooverinvestisanimportantwaytofulfilltheencroachment.In China,pyramidsshareholdingsarewide-spread,especiallyamongtheprivate companies.So,theremustbetheoreticalandpracticalsignificancestoresearch ontheoverinvestmentinprivatecompanieswhichownpyramidalholding structure.Inthispaper,basingontheintroductiontorelatedtheories,weclassifythe domesticandforeignliteraturesaboutpyramidalholdingstructureand overinvestment,andfindourstartingpoint,i.e.,verifyingtheeffectsofultimate controllers’separationdegreeoftworightsandfreecashflowon overinvestmentandtomakeoutthedirectcontrolchainthencombiningequity restrictionratioandotherinnergovernancefactorstoresearchonthe overinvestmentinprivatecompanies.Afterwards,wedefinetheconceptsof ultimatecontroller,separationdegreeoftworights,efficiencyofinvestmentand directcontrolchaininthispaper,andbasingontheseconceptsweperformthe theoreticalanalysesandputforwardsrelatedhypotheses.金字塔式控股结构上市公司过度投资研究ABSTRACT Then,intheempiricalanalysis,usingpaneld