考虑几种供应商行为特征的vmi模式分析-vmi model analysis considering several vendor behavior characteristics.docxVIP

考虑几种供应商行为特征的vmi模式分析-vmi model analysis considering several vendor behavior characteristics.docx

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考虑几种供应商行为特征的vmi模式分析-vmi model analysis considering several vendor behavior characteristics

ABSTRACTComparing with traditional Retailer Managed Inventory (RMI), Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) can be seen as an inventory management mode with an ?inversion of responsibility‘. It thus enables suppliers to assume more responsibility than ever when cooperating with other supply chain players. If the supplier participating in the application of VMI is a decision-maker with special behavioral characteristics (for instance, random output, tend to disclose information, overconfident or fairness preference), his decisions will intensively affect the application of VMI, the performances of other supply chain players and also the supply chain as a whole. Targeted on the issues above, we come up with the topic of ?Research on Vendor Managed Inventory Considering Supplier‘s Several Behavioral Characteristics‘; and discuss it in the following aspects:Evolutionary mechanism of vender managed inventory in a supply chain with a follower supplier. It is studied that the key factors and evolutionary mechanism for a supplier with weaker bargaining power applying VMI in a short term and in a long run respectively. By using evolutionary game theory, the threshold value of penalty cost is derived in a short term. Besides, evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of each participator‘s behavior are revealed in a long period as well.VMI coordinating models considering supplier‘s random yield. Based on stochastically proportional yield model, the problems of risk sharing and supply chain coordinating are discussed under the context that a distributer and a producer with random yield are cooperating to implement VMI. After constructing five different risk sharing contracts under the circumstance of a certain demand, I analyze the preferences of each participator to different contracts. Under the circumstance of an uncertain demand, a VMI coordination model based on risk sharing is established to make supply chain achieve optimal performance. It is also discussed that the influences of un

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