行政补偿制度的外文文献.pdf

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AS AN AGENCY PROBLEM Lucian Arye Bebchuk Jesse M. Fried Working Paper 9813 /papers/w9813 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 July 2003 We are grateful to Bradford Delong, Andrei Shleifer, Timothy Taylor, and Michael Waldman for many valuable suggestions. For financial support, we would like to thank the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business (Bebchuk) and the Boalt Hall Fund and U.C. Berkeley Committee on Research (Fried). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research ©2003 by Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried. All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source. Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried NBER Working Paper No. 9813 July 2003 JEL No. D23, G32, G34, G38, J33, J44, K22, M14 ABSTRACT This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a “managerial power” approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownershi