河北张承地区农业生态补偿地博弈论分析.docVIP

河北张承地区农业生态补偿的博弈论分析-农学论文 河北张承地区农业生态补偿的博弈论分析 郭 平，蒋秀兰，张新宁 （石家庄铁道大学经济管理学院，石家庄 050043） 摘要：张承地区日益严重的农业生态环境问题，从根本上说是农业生态系统各利益主体博弈的结果。农业生态补偿作为以经济手段调整损害与保护农业生态环境各利益相关方关系的一种模式，可以有效地保护农业生态环境。文章采用博弈论模型以张承地区的退耕还林补偿为例来讨论张承地区退耕还林工程补偿政策实践过程中的行为决策过程和现有的农业生态补偿机制。博弈分析表明，农业生态补偿政策的效果不完全取决于补偿金额的大小，仅仅依靠提高补偿标准来保护环境是不明智的；政府制定生态补偿政策同时应该将补偿年限纳入政策制定范畴中；张承地区服务业的发达程度以及当地居民收入水平会直接影响到农业生态工程效果。 关键词 ：张承地区；农业生态补偿；博弈论 中图分类号：F205；X321；Q14 文献标识码：A 文章编号：0439－8114（2015）06－1524-04 DOI:10.14088/j.cnki.issn0439-8114.2015.06.061 Game Theory Analysis on the Agricultural Ecological Compensation of Zhangjiakou-Chengde District GUO Ping，JIANG Xiu－lan，ZHANG Xin－ning （Colledge of Economics and Management， Shijiazhuang Railway University，Shijiazhuang 050043， China） Abstract： The increasingly serious Agricultural ecological environment problems of Zhangchen District were increasingly serious which were fundamentally the results of gaming among the major benefit bodies of the agricultural ecosystem． Agricultural ecological compensation as an institutional arrangement to adjust the damage and the protection of agricultural ecological environment interests relations， was an among the major benefit bodies of the effective measure to protect the ecological environment． This paper took Zhangjiakou-Chengde District’s returning farmland to forest compensation as an example to study its existing agricultural ecological compensation mechanism as well as the compensation policy making process between subject and object in the compensation process under the game theory． The analysis showed that the ecological compensation policy effect was not entirely depending on the amount of compensation in size， so only by improving the standard of compensation to protect environment was not wise； when the government formulates ecological compensation policy， they should take the scope of compensation limit into account； the development level of the third industry and the average income of the local people in the