公司治理与股价崩盘风险——基于A股上市房地产企业的实证研究-会计学专业论文.docx

摘 要 本文研究了后金融危机时代和房地产价格迅速上涨背景下的股价崩盘风险 与公司治理的关系。 本文以中国 A 股的 132 家上市房地产企业为研究对象，选取 2008-2013 年 的数据为研究样本，实证检验了股价崩盘风险与公司治理变量的关系。本文分 别选取股权集中度、董事会会议次数和董事会薪酬排名前三位成员的薪酬总额 占董事会所有成员薪酬总额的比例三个变量来具体讨论两者的关系。 通过静态检验和动态分析，本文主要得到了以下结论： （1）静态研究表明，公司的股权集中度越高，公司面临的股价崩盘风险越 低；董事会会议次数越多，公司面临的股价崩盘风险越低；薪酬比例越高，公 司面临的股价崩盘风险越高。 （2）然而，动态研究表明，股价崩盘风险并不随着股权集中度的提高、董 事会会议次数的增加而显著变化，但是股权集中度的降低、董事会会议次数的 减少会引起股价崩盘风险的显著上升；也不随着薪酬比例的降低而显著变化， 但是薪酬比例的提高会引起股价崩盘风险的显著上升。 本文主要有以下创新点：（1）在研究内容上，集中地从影响股价崩盘风险 的内部因素进行了分析；（2）发现了公司治理变量对股价崩盘风险影响的“平 台效应”和“滑坡效应”。 关键词：股价崩盘风险，公司治理，股权集中度，平台效应，滑坡效应 Abstract This article investigates the relationship between firm-specific stock price crash risk and corporate governance feature and mechanism in the context of post-financial crisis era and exuberance period of Chinese real estate market with soaring housing price. The author employ a dataset from all 132 Chinese listed property companies during 2008~2013 to document the relationship between firm-specific stock price crash risk and corporate governance feature and mechanism. Using a framework developed by Standard Poor and OECD on corporate governance, the author decomposes corporate governance into three dimensions, including ownership structure, board structure and procedure and CEO power and incentive. Selected from a variety of corporate governance measures, the author finally focus on three variables followed as centrality of ownership structure, frequency of board conference and bonus percentage scaled by the division of the first three board member’s compensation to the total compensation of all board members. The author implement both static and dynamic regression model to test the proposed hypothesis, and the results are as follows: Considering ownership structure, static research indicates that centrality is significantly negative correlated with crash risk, however, dynamic research shows that effect of centrality on crash risk is asymmetric, that is to say, crash risk does not significantly change with centrality, but