供应链融资视角的零售供应链博弈模型分析.pdf

ABSTRACT policy of retailer are all proportional to the retailers ’ funds holdings in the funding constrains of retailers in effect condition. This analysis testifies that the suppliers ’ optimal pricing under funding constrains of retailers in effect condition is higher than that under no funding constrains of retailers condition; and suppliers ’ maximum profit, retailers ’ optimal ordering and maximum profit are all lower than that under no funding constrains of retailers condition. The lack of funds leads to the loss of profits. In the end, the thesis search the retail supply chain considering supply chain financing, proving that there is only one optimal pricing strategy of supplier and optimal ordering policy of retailer under this condition. The sensitivity analysis of financing cost testifies that suppliers ’ optimal pricing and maximum profit, retailers ’ optimal ordering and maximum profit are all inversely proportional to the financing cost coefficient under the funds constraints and supply chain financing condition. We find that suppliers’ optimal pricing steadily increases separately in funds constraints and non-supply chain financing, no funds constraints and funds constraints in effect and supply chain financing. Suppliers ’ maximum profit, retailers ’ optimal ordering and maximum profit are all steadily increasing in funds constraints and non-supply chain financing, funds constraints in effect and supply chain financing, and no funds constraints. Keywords: Retail Supply Chain, Financing Model, Stackelberg Game, Capital Constrained