101s11是4aa29l01.pptVIP

And this sets us a problem no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative. For our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question. I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. 規範問題的出現 * Now the impulse doesnt dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to believe? I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesnt dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act? * The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward. 人的行動需要理由 * If the problem springs from reflection then the solution must do so as well. If the problem is that our perceptions and desires might not withstand reflective scrutiny, then the solution is that they might. We need reasons because our impulses must be able to withstand reflective scrutiny. We have reasons if they do. The normative word reason refers to a kind of reflective success. If good’ and right are also taken to be intrinsically normative words, names for things that automatically give us reasons, then they too must refer to reflective success. 有理由即反思成功 * * 頁碼 作品 版權標示 作者／來源 1-30 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2003多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用 2 善有善報…對我不利。 《纓絡經·有行無行品》 本作品已超過著作財產權存續期間，屬公共領域之著作。瀏覽日期：2014/03/28。 25-29 A lower animals…?must refer to reflective success. Korsgaard, C.. 1996.?The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.93-94 本網站係以著作權法第46、50、52、65條合理使用本件作品。 17 霍布斯的回答是…所以只要是理性利己的人都會選擇有道德。 授課教師整理自：Thomas Hobbes. 1660. The Leviathan. /instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviat